Sinkiang from this time on. Under their kindly patronage a cosmopolitan scholarship developed in the Western Regions, and to it Arab, Khitan, Mongol, Persian, and Tibetan, as well as Chinese, contributed. The vestiges of learned tomes, once impressive shrines, and even whole cities that are buried in the sands of the Takla Makan are evidences even now of this once flourishing native culture.

Authorities of the New Sinkiang have been re-awakening the pride of the Wei-wu-erh people of today on the basis of this ancient kingdom's grandeur, and these Wei-wu-erh may indeed be the modern heirs of the Uighur traditions. Tu Chung-yüan, who is one of those who openly calls the Wei-wu-erh the original settlers of the province, says that they are distributed throughout the south and in much of the north, being especially strong around Ha-mi, Kucha, Kashgar, and Khotan.

One of their principal centers is Kashgar. Perhaps these people are not as strict as some other Mohammedans in their observance of the principles of the Koran, but they do have great reverence for many Islamic rites and observances. They are of the Sunni sect, one of the two great branches into which Islam was split in 645 when the Caliphate was assumed by Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, in the midst of a dispute over the succession which has remained heated ever since. Whereas the Kanjutis across the border in Northwest India are Shias and follow a leader who traces his lineage to Caliph Ali, the Wei-wu-erh of Kashgar are among the most loyal Sunni Moslems in Chinese Turkestan.

The Wei-wu-erh have deep-set eyes and high noses, and Chinese are inclined to group them racially with the Turks. The girls are often exceptionally beautiful, with eyelashes inclined upwards and with jet hair topped by cheery pompoms and quaint petite caps. Maturity comes early in Turkestan, and often these girls marry before they are fifteen. Betrothal is pledged by a girl's father and mother, and the ceremony is performed by the local *A-hung*, or priest. There is understandable gaiety on the occasion, and considerable piping and drumming. The bride finally is borne on a donkey to the house of her future husband for completion of the ritual. If the husband and wife do not prove

562 177 There is, on the whole, a stirring, Wild West attractiveness about her appearance, this Kalmuck Mongol, even as she goes about the tasks of preparing cheese, chopping wood, or milking.

Nor is she necessarily an ignorant woman. A Mongol princess of Tihwa, for example, has studied English in Pei-p'ing, French and medicine at Brussels, and in addition speaks Russian as well as her native tongue. The problem of so-called Oriental conservatism, according to this woman's views, may have originated in a desire to be undisturbed. But she, and other Mongol intelligentsia, are alert and modest enough to admit that out of the creativeness of the Occident new light is being shed on how man might best live; from the history of such as she and her ancestors, the Occident has in its turn much to learn.

The Kirgiz

563 773 Another of the fascinating ethnic groups that roam the Sinkiang mountains and steppes are the Kirgiz. They are the people whom a legendary white Prester John is said to have ruled in the Middle Ages, and they are supposed to have introduced the Christianity of Nestorius to Asia. The Kirgiz are related to the old Uighurs also, it seems, and were powerful in the Altai region in the centuries just preceding the Mongol invasion. They, like the Mongols, are horsemen; but their homeland is in the steep crags, the narrow mountain trails and not so much in the steppes. Those who now live in the Pamirs fringing Southwest Sinkiang have their own legends of origin. It seems that there were once *kirk kiz*, "forty maidens," who became pregnant and so gave birth to the Kirgiz people. One version of the story is that they had intercourse with a red dog; another, that they dipped their fingers in a magic stream; a third, that the foam of Lake Issyk Kul served as the needed sperm.

795 622 Moslems of the Sunni order, the Kirgiz vest their tribal government in the hands of elders whose dicta are strictly respected. These elders adjudicate a multitude of questions such as those of petty thievery, pastoral boundaries, and property settlements. No foreigner is supposed to witness a Kirgiz court, which often meets in an ante-room of an *ak-ui* or *kirga*—the native tent dwelling. Adjournment of the court is sig-

S N 311 The newest development, found in the Northwest, especially in Sinkiang, is the partial industrialization of those areas which are the sources of coal, oil, gold, iron, alum, quartz, gypsum, nitrates, salt, and, as recently reported, uranium.

S N 563 The non-Chinese peoples of the Northwest are not only outnumbered b ut also outweighed in economic and political respects. For more than two thousand years, the Chinese have been ruling those areas (with short interruptions as far as Sinkiang and Chinghai are concerned), even though they never had more than a few garrisons stationed in frontier areas. Those garrisons made it possible for a thin stratum of Chinese officials to rule the areas on the top level. On the lower level, the indigenous peoples and tribes governed themselves - under the supervision of the Chinese viceroys or governors and their bureaucracy.

S N 175 642 197 631 The general policy of the Chinese government in Peking was to make use of the existing form of governmental institutions of frontier areas like Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Inner-Mongolia. In Sinkiang (prior to 1884 it was called "Hui-chiang," i.e., Muslimic Dominion), two types of local government had existed: the Muslimic type and the Mongolian type. The [171] Northern and Northeastern part of Sinkiang, where the Mongols were the dominant inhabitants, had the same governmental institutions as Outer and Inner-Mongolia, namely, banners ruled by dzasaks, who were appointees of the Emperor in Peking. The Republic of China tacitly recognized their ranks [668] and interfered very little with their functions. Only Communist [565] China deprived the nomad aristocracy of their titles and rights.

S N 175 631 795 647 657 The Muslimic communities were fuled by Bäks with various ranks: the Ak'im Bäk, "local governor"; the Ishkhan Bäk, "assistant governor"; the Shang Bäk, "collector of revenue"; the Qazi, "judge"; the Kukbashi or Mirabu Bäk, "superintendant of agriculture"; Yüzbashi, "hundred-men-leader"; Onbashi, "ten-men-leader"; etc. All the local Bäks were appointed by the emperor or later on by the president of the Republic upon the recommendation of the Imperial or Republican governor, although it must be stated that some governors of Sinkiang, Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, ruled and governed the province without asking Peking for the consent of appointments.

S N 175 631 647 [202] 000 Besides the Chinese civil service there existed Chinese military staffs and detachments, centered in Ili, Urumchi, Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashghar, Sining, Su-chou, Lan-chou, etc. Relay stations provided communication between the government in Peking and the frontier areas. Maintaining the effectiveness of the means of communications was an important duty of Chinese officials. Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1 ●

SN 668 186 Based on our experience with Soviet Russia, there can be little doubt that the Chinese Communist propaganda has been, or will be, successful in building up a tremendous feeling for nation and nationality, an artificial and overemphasized SN [182] pride for everything which is China or Chinese. The Chinese society in the Northwest might be described as stable and united because of its common history, common language, common beliefs, common pattern of living (agriculture by means of irrigation accounting for ninety-five percent) and common fate. We do not refer to the artificial stability and unity enforced by secret police and military garrisons which might turn into a genuine stability like that in Russia after a long period of propaganda. Training of the younger generation and making propagandistic use of political mistakes committed by other powers, like Hitler's lost war against Russia, which was the last step in SN developing a final and real unity among Russians.

Turning back to the minorities, we can say that the Turks 563 and the Chinese Muslims do have a sense of mission in ● 795 regard to their religion. For centuries the Muslim has been 797 taught to fight and to convert the "non-believers" to the "only 668 true faith on earth": Islam (Mohammedanism). How strong their feeling is in regard to their religion may be seen from the fact that the Communist regime avoids carefully interference in religious matters and even permits every religious activity to continue, including the pilgrimage to Mecca. Of course, the average Muslim is hardly aware of the fact that the top level Muslim leadership is under complete control of the Com- S munist regime. As a religious group the Turks (Eastern 563 Turks, Salars, Kirghiz, Kazakhs and some small islamized 795 Tibetan clans) and the Dungans (Chinese Muslims) are united to a certain degree and they do have a sense of common destiny, repeatedly brought forward, when political events showed that they considered themselves one single group, imbued with common fate, which culminated in their idea and highest aim: the attempt to erect their own Islamic Empire and realm, an attempt which cost hecatombs of blood but never came true. Their perception and conviction that the support of their highest spiritual leaders, first the Caliph of Baghdad, then the Sultan of Constantinople and finally the Great Mufti of Jerusalem (in spite of Stalin's and Ata Turk's discouraging denoucement of any Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkic movement) developed their group feeling and group conscious- SN ness.

563 As far as the Mongols of the Northwest are concerned, it can be stated that because of their geographical separation SN (see map of ethnic groups) political disunion was inevitable. [795] However, as an ethnic and religious group (the Mongols are

SN 563 [795] all Buddhists) they have a strong feeling of belonging together. Nevertheless the Mongols are fully aware that their former power is declining more and more every decade and that their pastures are constantly diminishing because of the encroachment of agriculture and Chinese migration pressure. The establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (to which the Edzin Gol and Alashan areas have recently been added) and the organization of several autonomous chou for the Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinghai, might restore to a small degree the hope for recovery of their lost strength and political power, a hope which has been stimulated during the Sino-Japanese war. In addition, the organization of those autonomies will certainly raise their feeling of security, and might east the widespread desperation of Mongolian leaders who have anticipated the final decline of the Mongols as an ethnic group and a linguistic unit because of rapid sinification and loss of pasture land, and therefore loss of cattle, the only SN 563 668 179 life resource of the average Mongol. It is difficult to say what effect the Communist regime will have on the ethnic group of the Mongols. So far, the Mongolian indigenous culture has been fostered by the Communist regime, but there is little doubt that, when it comes, the complete transition of the Mongolian society into a Communistic society will not be carried out without resistance and ensuing hatred. It is unthinkable that the average Mongol, who for centuries has adhered to the simple pattern of nomadic life (owning cattle individually and only pastures collectively) will agree with the policy of bolshevization. It can be easily conceived that deprivation of their cattle will mean the end of the nomadic Mongolian society as such. What has been said about the Mongols may very well be true also for the Kazakhs and Kirghiz.

SN 181 IV. Dominant Social Motives.

The dominant social motive of the average citizen of the Northwest depends largely on his ethnic group affiliation. Starting with the majority, the Chinese, it should be repeated that they are diligent and industrious farmers whose whole energies must be used in order to maintain their families, who SN 181 771 [769] cooperatively toil in the fields and earn just enough to live on. In such a setup little room is left for cultural and religious ambitions; although ancestor worship is sincerely practiced it is difficult to say whether this kind of worship is a true religious phenomenon or only a reflection of the traditional respect toward elders and parents. The religious behavior

/The New Uighurs/

563 565 A small percentage of these landlords have invested their wealth exclusively in irrigation projects since water constitutes the most profitable commodity.

563 565 793 [871] 3. The rest of the New Uighur population is subdivided into the following social groupings: a. The clergy (Muezzin, Iman, Mullah, etc.) constitutes a very important segment of the social structure. In its hands the education of the youth rested up to 1949, and it played an important role in shaping the character of the community. As the representatives of the mosque, they are not only the spiritual leaders of the community, but they are also the administrators of the land belonging to the mosque.

563 565 795 [423] This land came into the possession of the mosque as bequests from pious Moslems. Thus, the mosque is not only a spiritual, but also an economic, center. In addition, the mosque serves as a social welfare institution, in that it cares for all those persons of the community who are unable to make a living.

563 565 441 b. The merchants constitute the last segment of the New Uighur class structure. After the Arab conquest of Inner Asia, the merchants enlarged and promoted existing trade centers, thereby acquiring greater wealth and influence. It is noteworthy that most merchants in the Northwest are Moslems. In their hands rest not only most economic activities, but also the dissemination of Turkic and Arab culture. In the merchant ranks, the Chinese found willing and able officials who enjoyed the same privileges as did the Chinese administrators. However, in the Moslem uprisings, these officials aligned themselves with the Moslem population, and often assumed leadership in these movements of rebellion against the Chinese rulers. It may be presumed that to a large extent the Moslem uprisings in the Northwest were incited by the merchants.

563 [591] Among the New Uighurs residence is bilocal. Dwellings are usually occupied by extended families who either form an economic unit, or work as individuals or a family group on the fields or irrigation projects of a wealthy landowner. Polygamy [595] is practiced by the wealthier Moslems, especially the merchants [556] of Sinkiang, who have wives at different trading centers and therefore become the masters of several family units. The [851] children resulting from these marriages are all treated as equals. Inheritance follows the rules of primogeniture. In [428] contrast to the nomadic peoples of Sinkiang, whose women oc- [562] cupy a relatively high and valuable position, the women of the sedentary peoples of the same area, the Turkic women, are held in low esteem. The Sinkiang nomad must buy his bride

S N 563 763 769

making of a will, the giving of alms, rites at the grave, and the recitation of prayers and giving of alms on certain days after death, and on the first, second and third anniversaries.

The Moslems have their own burial grounds. The mounds raised over the graves are rectangular, not round as in the case of the Chinese. The top of the filled grave must be at least five inches (half a Chinese foot) above the surrounding earth, lest the location be forgotten. A stone may be erected in front of the grave, but the name of the deceased may not be engraved upon it.

S N 563 764

S N 563 796

e. Festivals and holidays

Many of the religious festivals are more pagan than Moslem, especially those which are seasonal and therefore not connected with the Moslem calendar. Their celebrations are merely popular gatherings for feasting and enjoyment.

The Moslem New Year (Yengi Yil) celebrates the breaking of the Ramadan fast. The festival takes place during the first three days of the tenth month by the Moslem calendar. Special services are held in the mosques. The people bathe and dress in their best clothes. It is a time of greeting, well-wishing, feasting, visiting and gift-giving. For the Moslems and the Chinese alike, the New Year celebration is the greatest holiday of the year.

S N 563 795 668 199

5. Present day conditions

According to a speech delivered by Burkhan, chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the China Islamic Association, at the Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions, on October 18, 1952, the Islam religion as well as the customs and habits of its followers are fully respected by the Communist regime. Chinese Moslems are free to practice their faith without interference. It is also said that official circulars from Peking have ordered the people to continue the observance of their important festivals. The tax on the slaughter of cattle for Moslem consumption is abolished, and official holidays are granted on Moslem holidays.

S N [423]

In accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law, the mosques may retain their land holdings if the local populace so desire. It is also reported that when the land reform movement was carried out in the Northwest, the land of the mosques was in most cases left untouched. There was also a report of an organized Hajji to Mecca in 1952, which for reasons unknown failed to reach its goal. Special government regulations give Moslem workers in public organizations and educational institutions time off on the more important religious festival days. In military units, factories and schools, consideration is also given to the habits and customs of cadres, soldiers, workers and students of the Moslem faith.

N D. The Sects of Islam

795 The two major sects of Islam are the Sunna and the Shi'a. Both of these camps are divided internally into numerous sub-sects, a discussion of which will not be included in this chapter.

N 795 798 The schism between the Sunna and Shi'a occurred first on the political question of the legitimate succession to Muhammad's leadership in the Islamic world. The Sunnis claimed that the Caliphs were the legitimate heads of the Islamic community. The Shi'a followers repudiated the first three Caliphs, Abu Bakr, Omar and Uthman, as usurpers, and declared Ali, Muhammad's son-in-law, to be the true successor, and his house to be the only source for the selection of future Caliphs.

The Shi'a sect seceded on a purely political basis, but it also began to develop its own characteristics in matters relating to religious doctrine. It spread widely in Persia and Iraq and assimilated a great amount of the esoteric non-Moslem doctrines which prevailed among the newly converted Moslems.

N 779 795 798 In particular, a special doctrine concerning the nature of political leadership of Islam divides the Sunnis and the Shi'is. The Shi'is attribute to the Imam (the political leader) a spiritual function which the orthodox Sunni theologians never granted to their Caliphs. This doctrine of the Imamate gradually crystallized into definite theological form. The Imams acquired a superhuman character and their decisions on both political and theological questions are not to be contested.

N 795 The mystical movement in Islam, Sufism, found followers in both camps, and is popular mainly among the masses of the people.

S E. The Turkic Moslems of Sinkiang

563 795 The majority of the population of Sinkiang is Moslem by religion. The Moslems include the Eastern Turkis, the Kirghiz and Kazakh nomadic tribes, a small number of Chinese Moslems and a few Afghans, Indians and Tajiks, most of whom reside only temporarily in Sinkiang.

The Turks of Sinkiang are Sunnis of the Hanefite School. Unlike the Chinese Moslems, they have maintained close ties with the rest of the Moslem world. The idea of the cohesiveness of all believers is very strong in Islam. The Turks of Sinkiang not only feel strong national ties with their Turkic brothers in Western Turkestan, but they also consider themselves an integral part of the Moslem world community. In the past they recognized as the chief of all believers (emir el mu'minin) the Khan of Bukhara, and they looked to the Sultan of Constantinople as the political leader of Islam.

S 779 Sinkiang can be called a Moslem country, but it has features which are peculiar to it, and which have greatly changed the

/Turkic Moslems of Sinkiang/

799 character of Islam. In Sinkiang, Islam has been affected by two major factors. The first one is that Islam has been superimposed over a civilization which contained Shamanist, Buddhist, Manichaeanist and Nestorian elements. Many Buddhist traditions have not been erased completely by Islamic beliefs. These traditions have been incorporated into Islam, although totally foreign to it, and they have acquired a superficial Moslem character.

799 177 The second fact that had considerable influence upon the development of Islam in Sinkiang is that the country is under Chinese administration. As already explained, Islam is not merely a religious faith, but it encompasses many aspects of the entire way of life of the Moslems. As a result of Chinese administration, all those functions of Islam that are not concerned with the articles of faith and strictly religious rites, have been taken [671] over by the Chinese. The law of the country is the Chinese secular law, and not the Moslem religious one. The courts of law [672] are administered by Chinese civil servants rather than by the Moslem Qazis (judges).

799 794 563 The Turkic Moslems in Sinkiang are not very strict in their observance of religious practices. There is only a small number of people (mainly Kirghiz) who perform the ablutions and say the prayers regularly, pay the Zakat to the mosque, medresses (mosque schools) and the poor, wear a turban and abstain from smoking and drinking. The majority of the people (this applies to the East Turki as a whole) do not perform the ablutions nor prayers. Except on holidays there are very few people in the mosque during the services. The people do not give the required Zakat, and they smoke tobacco and even opium. Though they are quite strict about not eating pork, they do not abstain from drinking wine and other alcoholic beverages. Few of the women veil themselves in public, and they go unsupervised in the market places. The Sunni Turki in Sinkiang have no scruples about letting their daughters marry the Balti Shi'is (most other Sunni Moslems consider it a great offense). The people as a whole are very poorly instructed in the matters of religion. Most know the fatihat sura (the opening chapter of the Koran), but few know more. Holidays are more strictly observed than are other rites. [796] Though Ramadan imposes rigid restrictions during the daytime, at night the Moslems of Sinkiang compensate festively for their daily sacrifices. Id-el-Fitr, the Moslem New Year celebration in the tenth month, is one of the most joyful and colorful holidays in Sinkiang. The people attire themselves in new clothes, attend the special services in the mosques, greet each other, visit friends and attend feasts.

795 796 798 As Grenard points out, the cult of Imams and other Moslem saints which is an integral part of Islam in Sinkiang, goes back

795 796 798 to religions other and older than Islam. The Moslem priests, powerless to destroy the popular worship of certain shrines, adopted those shrines and named them after Islamic personages.

The Turki is a great believer in the efficacy of local saints, and there are innumerable shrines all over the country dedicated not only to the "imams," but to later saints and heroes. These sanctuaries usually have some beliefs and observances attached to them, connected either with the curing of diseases or with the bearing of children. At shrines of the latter type, the majority of pilgrims are women. The mullas have therefore been obliged, for the sake of propriety, in each case to invent a female saint, complete with legend, to bring the cult in line with Islam. The [798] [769] popular names of the shrines reveal that most of these cults have been derived from the ancient practices of ancestor worship.

791 796 Paganism, as well as ancestor worship, is still prevalent in this land despite a thousand years of Islam. Many of the religious festivals, especially those which are seasonal and therefore not connected with the Moslem calendar, are more pagan than Moslem. They are merely popular gatherings for the purpose of feasting and enjoyment, and are probably older than Islam.

793 794 The clergy in Sinkiang is divided into two categories: the judges and the priests in one, and the simple clerks in the other (the mullas). The latter class includes all males who can read and write and wear a turban. Above these mullas, there is a class of mosque officials with specific functions: the Muazzin, who calls the believers to attend the daily prayers, the Imam, who leads the services, the Mutakib, in charge of seeing that the laws of the Koran are observed, the Reis, prefect of discipline, the Khatib, who delivers the Friday sermon, and the mulla a'lam, doctor of law who is also in charge of the circumcision ceremony.

793 [423] The resources of the clergy consisted mostly of waqf, land property which had been donated to them or confiscated by them. In spite of the Chinese confiscations of clergy landed property, until recent times this constituted an important source of income for the clergy. Other clergy sources are the Zakat, donations from richer believers, casual fees, judicial fees, and fees paid for marriages, funerals and so forth. The Zakat is not a very substantial source of income, as the Sinkiang Moslems are lax in adhering to this obligation. At present it is almost impossible for the clergy to subsist without resorting to some secular occupation.

793 692 [177] The judicial power and the police functions of the clergy in the past have diminished greatly during the Chinese administration. The Qazis judge cases which are brought voluntarily to

them. Nowadays these are more cases of private feuds than law suits. Even when a Qazi exercises his judicial powers, he has no authority to enforce the verdict. The position of the reis is purely symbolic, and that of the Mutaki merely one of consultative powers.

F. The Chinese Moslems

The Chinese Moslems are a different sect of Islam than the Turkic Moslems in Sinkiang. They constitute a religious and, to an extent, a racial minority in China proper. The same is not true of the Turkic Moslems, who form a major section of the population in Sinkiang, and who in reality are not a national and religious minority. However, in Northwest China, the number of Chinese Moslems is much greater than in other parts of China, with the possible exceptions of Yunnan and Peking. Many differences between the Chinese Moslems and the Turkic Moslems stem from this factor alone. The Chinese Moslems are much influenced by an environment which is foreign to Islam. They have accepted many of the local customs and have integrated them into their own rites. This process has been both voluntary and forced. The Chinese Moslems, through the process of intermarriage and living within a majority of non-Moslems, have absorbed some of their customs, perhaps without realizing it. To avoid persecution and suspicion from the rest of the people, they have been forced to adopt others.

Another important factor in the shaping of Islam in China is the virtual isolation of the Chinese Moslem communities from other centers of Islam, an isolation which has existed for many centuries. Islam in China has been deprived of many of the contributions made later to the religious doctrine and practice by various philosophic and juristic scholars in Western Asia. Islam in China, consequently, developed its own peculiar characteristics (mainly in ritual). The Chinese Moslems have not contributed anything of major importance to the fields of Islam's philosophy and theological thought.

The Chinese Moslems are commonly called Dungans. They themselves do not use the name, but term themselves Hui-hui or Hui tzu. This appellation is applied by the Chinese to all Moslems, whether residents of China proper or Turkestan. Islam is commonly designated Hui-Hui Chiao (the religion of the Hui Hui). It is also known as Ch'ing-chen Chiao (The Pure and True Religion), or the Hsiao-chiao (minor religion) as contrasted with Confucianism, the "Great Religion." The Communists refer to them as Hui. The meaning and origin of the name Hui-hui are not known. There are many varying opinions on the subject. Some say Hui-hui is a corruption of the name Uighur; others, that it is equivalent to the Arabic term Islam, the character Hui signifying "to return".

/Chinese Moslems/

000 acter Hui signifying "to return."

S N 795 361 The Chinese Moslems live in small, closely knit communities, organized around the mosques. The Moslem community is usually set apart from the general Chinese community. The Moslems may form a whole village, or a certain suburb or section of town. The communities are organized on a local basis and there is no higher religious authority that unites all the communities. The mosques, the religious and social centers of the Moslem communities, are maintained independently.

S N 795 182 At least ostensibly, the religious attitude of the Chinese Moslims is characterized by moderation. They make concessions to the ruling power, hoping thus to gain security for person and property. The more capable and resolute of those who enter into government service take part in the ceremonial of the national cult.

S N 795 794 [346] The Moslems in the Northwest do not publicly practice their religion, nor do they advertise it. In some cases their mosques are dissimulated, so that they cannot be distinguished easily from other houses in the village. They are quite lax in their observances of the different rituals connected with Islam. The Chinese Moslems do not regularly attend religious services in the mosque. Aside from the ahung (the religious leader of the S N [793] Chinese Moslem community) and the extremely orthodox people they do not pray five times a day, but once or twice at most. [782] The noon service is the most popular one, and the place of worship is limited to the mosque. The manner of calling for prayer differs in China from that in Western Asia. The Muazzin does not chant the call to prayer. He stands on the roof of the mosque and shouts the invitation to prayer and may strike a special wooden instrument called ta-p'an-tzu. Most Moslems will ignore the worship time if it interferes with their daily business. Except for some minor differences, the prayer ceremony is conducted in a manner similar to that in Western Asia.

S N [562] Women are not allowed to attend the mosques where the men pray. In some of the larger communities, the women may have a mosque of their own, but in most places they worship individually.

The Friday service draws the best attendance, although certainly not all nor even the majority of believers. On this day the sermon is delivered by the Khatib, a special person, not necessarily a religious leader, elected for the purpose. It is usually in Arabic, and few of those present can understand it.

S N 795 785 796 203 [184] The Fast of Ramadan is one of the rituals which is observed with a degree of strictness in Moslem communities throughout China. In many places there are special messengers who go about the Moslem quarters calling out the times for observing and breaking the fast. Messengers also go around at night lest

S N 795 795 796 203

/Chinese Moslems/

any should oversleep and fail to eat the necessary food before daybreak.

The regular practice of Zakat is practically unknown to the Chinese Moslem community. Only during the month of Ramadan, when charity is extended to the poor and donations are given to the ahung are alms given in a form resembling Zakat. There is no fixed amount given and the act itself is purely voluntary. The only form of sadaqa (voluntary alms) given is the sadaqa el-fitr given in the three days of Id el Fitr (the Moslem New Year). These offerings can be made in cash or in goods.

S N 795 788

Particularly among the Chinese Moslems of the Northwest the practice of pilgrimage to Mecca was observed. The Hajjis, or those who completed their pilgrimage to Mecca, were highly respected in their communities. Pilgrimage has decreased considerably in the last years. The Hajj organized by the China Islamic Society in 1952 did not reach Mecca; they went as far as Pakistan and returned to Peking, for reasons that were not specified.

S N 795 796

Id el-Fitr, the New Year, is the best observed of the different Moslem holidays. It occurs during the first three days of the tenth month. Special services are held in the different Moslem communities, and great feasts are given to celebrate the occasion.

S N 795 262

In general the Chinese Moslems do abstain from pork and wine as their religion commands. They will not eat meat that has not been killed in the approved Moslem fashion. Many of the merchants, carters and others who travel carry their own utensils, and often, where there are no Moslem communities, carry their own food so as to avoid food that is prohibited by their religion.

S N 795 769 177

The influence of the general Chinese beliefs on the Moslems has been noted by many, particularly by D'Ollone. Ancestor worship is the core of the non-Moslem Chinese belief. It is not restricted to domestic worship but extends to religious devotion to the graves of the ancestors, which are designed to assure the peace of the deceased and are a scene of devotion every anniversary. The Moslems of the Northwest have been so influenced by these traditions that, in the secrecy of their homes, most of them burn incense in front of the ancestors' tablets. In evidence of this custom, D'Ollone brought back two vases which served the purpose of ancestor worship. Both of these vases belonged to Chinese Moslems, and had Moslem religious inscriptions in Arabic. The practice of pilgrimage to the well kept tombs of the ancestors is also found among the Chinese Moslems of Kansu. Some of the bigger tombs are quite elaborate and include, besides the monuments, a mosque, school halls and lodging places.

N 795 788 778

SN 795 621 993 /Chinese Moslems/

The Chinese Moslem community differs from the Turkic Moslem community mainly in the organization of the community around the mosque and in the peculiar position the ahung holds in the community. The ahung holds the central position in both the religious and the social life. In principle, the Islamic community has no professional priests, but in China the ahung has actually taken the place of one. The Imam, whose office is important in Western Asia and Eastern Turkestan, where he has leadership in religious life, has lost his pre-eminent position in China. So has the Muazzin (the one who calls people for prayer) and the Mufti (the teacher of law). At present these positions have been practically abolished. Those who hold the title have no particular importance in the community. These titles are inherited and are not conferred by virtue of any knowledge of Islamic affairs. The ahung is the only real Moslem scholar in the Chinese Moslem community. He is nominated to this position by virtue of his knowledge of the details and philosophy of the religion. He trains students, the Khalifa, to become the future ahungs and to continue to maintain Islamic life in China.

SN [554]

G. Chinese Moslem Sects

SN 795 185 [175]

After the pilgrims had established some contact with the rest of the Moslem world, there were attempts, many of them springing in the Northwest, to reform Islam in China. The first well-known attempt of this sort was made by Muhammad Amin, known in China as Ma Ning-hsia, who in 1781 appeared among the Salars and introduced some reforms concerning the rituals of Islam, correcting some of the practices which seemed not to be in accordance with those he had observed in Mecca.

However, of all the most notoriously successful is the sect of Ma Hua-lung, the hsin-chiao or the new doctrine, as contrasted with the traditional religion practiced by the Chinese Moslems, Lao-chiao or the old doctrine.

SN 795 792 185

The new sect is to be set apart from the rest of Islam in China. In spite of the Islamic Chinese tradition regarding religious leaders, their being chosen by the community to serve it, and known only to their adherents, Ma Hua-lung's name was known far beyond his immediate followers. To some he was a prophet, and others detested him as an impostor.

The nature of Ma Hua-lung's teachings still remains somewhat of a mystery. There is a tendency to regard them as endorsements of Shi'ism, or perhaps as an unusually bold representation of Sufism (mysticism in Islam). However, the notices of D'Ollohe show that actually they are genuinely Sunni in character and not a variety of the mystical philosophy widely diffused throughout Central Asia. Ma Hua-lung was regarded as an incarnation of the Spirit—a sheng jen (holy man, prophet)

S N 795 795 792 185 equal to or even higher than Muhammad himself. Most of his followers were uneducated. They believed that he had divine revelations since, without instruction, he had answers to all questions and appeared to know many things. As the founder of a new sect, he had to prescribe certain external forms by which his adherents might be distinguished from others. The differences he ordered are best described by W. T. Chan in the following passage:

"The New Sect insists that a certain chapter of the Koran should be recited once only instead of three times as held by the Old Sect, that at prayer clasped hands should be raised once instead of twice, that after a meal there is no need to raise clasped hands in greeting, and that in singing the praise of Allah the voice should be low instead of high. With reference to religious service, the New Sect does not allow any substituting for an ahung in preaching, whereas the Old Sect permits such an arrangement. The two sects also disagree on the basis for calculating the period of fasting, with the New Sect adhering strictly to the Arabic method and the Old Sect following the Chinese lunar Calendar. The New Sect believes that at funerals the mourners should take off their shoes, and stand on a mat while praying for the dead, whereas the Old Sect holds fast to the tradition of standing on the ground with the shoes on. The New Sect also directs that the corpse be laid on the ground, whereas the Old Sect insists on its being on a platform. There is also a disagreement as to whether there should be an honoraria for preachers. In short, the New Sect insists on returning to Islamic traditions, but the Old Sect prefers to keep the customs that have developed in China through the centuries." (Religious Trends in Moslem China, p. 193.)

S N 795 792 [664] Being partly dedicated to ideas of forming a Moslem state in the Northwest, independent of China proper, Ma Hua-lung played a very important role in the Moslem rebellion during the nineteenth century.

S N [578] After the death of Ma Hua-lung, friction developed in his sect. His son-in-law, Ma Ta-hsi, and his grandson, Ma Hi-hsi, fought each other for the sacred inheritance. Ma Ta-hsi had the advantage of numbers and his place of residence, Cha-ku, became an important religious center.

S N 795 Chang distinguished another sect existing in the Northwest, which he identifies as the New New Sect. Unfortunately there is not much evidence as to its nature. He also mentions a Sufi order in the Northwest called Che-ho-yeh (corruption of Jahrivah). The latter is described as "having an abbot, like the Buddhist lama. It is heavily superstitious and is generally despised by other schools." D'Ollone and Hartmann, however, identify this sect as that of Ma Hua-lung, the name Jahriva

S N 795 referring to "those who pray openly," contrasted with Khafira (identified as the Old Sect) or "those who pray secretly."

All the sects described above belong to the Sunni order; there are extremely few Shi'is among the Chinese Moslems. These sects have retained continuous hostility, which has manifested itself in violence, at times even resulting in bloodshed.

H. The Salars

N 795 563 [197] [142] The Salars are another group of Moslems, distinct from the Dungans, who live in China. They differ considerably from the Chinese Moslems in appearance, and they speak a form of corrupt Turkish.

N 795 [361] The Salars live in Hsün-hua-t'ing on the right bank of the Huang-ho, and in the surrounding villages. They are also found on the road from Sining to Ho-chou. In religion they are Sunnis of the Hanefite School. They are not very strict in their observance of the different Moslem rites, and are known to be heavy drinkers. Although they do not observe the rites of Islam in a strict manner, they feel very strongly about their belonging to the world Moslem community and are quite fanatic in this respect. They have participated in many of the rebellions against the Han Chinese in the Northwest. Their clergy, who are greatly respected, are leaders of the Salar community.

N [669] [793]

N [177] [212] Unlike the Chinese Moslems, the Salars have not assimilated many of the customs and beliefs of the Chinese. They do not burn incense nor pay special reverence to their ancestors. They have a much better knowledge of the Arabic language than have the Dungans, and even the lowest classes are acquainted with the Arabic alphabet. They are said to have received their present form of religion from Ma Ming-hsin (Muhammad Amin).

III. Religious Life of the Chinese in the Northwest

A. Sites of Religious Traditions

N 346 778 The Northwest includes what was once the economic and administrative center of the Chinese Empire. In the city of Sian and its surroundings, some of the older relics of religious institutions can still be seen. The memory of the great culture heroes of the past is particularly strong here and many of them are still worshipped in temples and shrines. Foremost among them is the Great Yü, tamer of the flood, who, according to legend, made life in this region possible by draining the excess water off through the narrows of T'ung-kuan. Among the famous Buddhist temples of Sian is the Wo-lung-ssu (The Temple of the Sleeping Dragon) which was built in Han times and has been a place of continuous reverence by emperors and peasants ever since. It contained a famous mural of the Kuanyin by Wu Tao-zu

N
771
182 "The traditions, the rituals, the basic and essential relationships which govern men's intercourse, control the small circle living in such far-away places as rigidly as they control the
N family which dwells in one of China's great cities. Both act according to principles laid down by ancestors, whose control is
[769] so subtle and so little questioned as to leave no room for the spontaneous and the unusual." (Cable and French, The Gobi Desert, 165-166.)

S
771 Chinese settlers in Sinkiang of course reflect the religious characteristics of their origin. Among the old settlers, who
• 795 came into the country with Tso Tsung-t'ang, the secret society
[575] tradition is still strong. Merchants, mostly from Tientsin, almost universally belong to the Tsai-li sect which forbids its adherents indulgence in drinking and smoking.

IV. Religion under the Communists

N
795 A. Islam
*668
177 When they were fighting for the supremacy of China in the years following World War II and when they first came to power in 1949, the Chinese Communists promised religious freedom to the national minorities in an effort to gain their support. Article 53 of the Common Program of the CPPCC, promulgated in September, 1949, stated that "the national minorities shall have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs." Mosques were promised exemption from taxes and Article 3 of the Agrarian Reform Law, published in June 1950, which decreed the confiscation of the land belonging to ancestral shrines, Buddhist temples and Christian churches and schools, provided for the retention of land by the mosques, subject to the wishes of local Moslem residents. As a further effort to win over the Moslem population of the Northwest, the Government Administration Council issued in December, 1950, a directive permitting the observance of the festivals of Id-el-Fitr, Corban and Molid Nabawi. It abolished tax on the slaughter of cattle for celebration of these festivals and permitted holidays for cadres, soldiers, workers and students of Moslem faith. State trading companies were instructed to sell daily necessities to the Moslems, during these festivals, at reduced prices.

These pronouncements made up the sum total of what the propaganda of the Chinese Communists called the "policy of
N benevolence" toward the national minorities. They were given
[798] tremendous publicity which served to overshadow the grimmer and more gory record of persecution of the Moslem peoples in the Northwest. The reasons for the ostensible policy of toler-

N
795 ance toward the Moslems may be as follows:
* 668 1. The strong cohesiveness of the Moslems in China. Unlike
177 the followers of other faiths, such as Buddhism and Taoism, who were scattered and disorganized, the Moslems in China and in the border regions are strongly organized and, at times, have presented a united front toward their enemies. This was one of the first lessons learned by the Chinese Communists. For example, early in 1949 when the People's Liberation Army, on entering Peking, wanted to occupy one of the mosques, a crowd of Moslems immediately gathered at the entrance of the mosque, voicing belligerently their determination to defend it. It was only upon the intervention of the Commission of Nationality Affairs that the PLA agreed to drop its demands.

In view of the predominance of the Moslem population in the
N Northwest, especially in Sinkiang which is far from the locus of
795 Chinese Communist power and where Soviet influence was
* 668 strong, the Chinese Communists were obliged to adopt a conci-
177 liatory, go-slow policy in order to bring the Moslems in line.
S
• 795 2. Instead of outright persecution, the Chinese Communists,
668 recognizing the traditional deference of the Moslems to their
177 leaders and their attachment to organizations, sought to control them by winning over their leaders and dominating them indirectly through the agency of mass organizations. Of these mass organizations, two were especially designed for the control of the Moslem peoples as a religious faction: the China Islamic Association and the China Hui Cultural Association, both established in May 1953, and both predominantly staffed by Chinese Moslems (Hui or Dungans) instead of Moslems of other races.
S The chairman of the China Islamic Association is Burkhan,
[635] governor of Sinkiang (now chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region), who is apparently a figurehead. In the executive committee of the China Islamic Association, thirty-one of the forty members are Chinese Moslems and only four including Burkhan are Uighur. The China Hui Cultural Association, headed by Liu Ko-p'ing, is almost exclusively a Chinese Moslem organization.

The purpose of the China Islamic Association, stated Burkhan in a speech in October, 1952, was to assist the government to implement the policy of religious freedom and to include the representative figures of Moslem faith throughout the country. The vice chairmen of the association, Liu Ko-p'ing, Shaikh Nur Mohammad Ta Pu-sheng, Yussuf Ma Yü-huai, Ma Chien and Saifuddin, are all loyal Communist followers. In their speeches at the preparatory meeting of the association, July 27-31, 1952, Chang Hsi-jo, vice chairman of the Financial-Economic Commission of the GAC, and Ulanfu, vice chairman of the National-

N
795 ity Affairs Commission, both stressed that the aim of the assoc-
*668 iation was to imbue its members with the love for the fatherland.
177
S In Sinkiang and other concentrations of Moslem population in
• 795 China, branches of the China Islamic Association and the cul-
668 tural associations established by the Communists, have supple-
177 mented the Islamic church, and the function of the Moslem dignitaries.

N 3. A more important reason for the apparently tolerant atti-
795 tude of the Chinese Communists toward Islam is the utilization
648 of the Moslem leaders for the purpose of propaganda, both
*668 domestic and foreign. In a speech at the third session of the
177 First National Committee of the CPPCC, October, 1951, Ma Chien declared: "I have received numerous letters from the ahungs in the Northwest and the Southwest regions expressing their desire to study and to reform themselves. In order to assist them to study the revolutionary ideas of Mao Tse-tung as well as to enable these theories to be universally made known to the people of the Middle East and North Africa, we have translated the following documents of the CPPCC: 'On New Democracy,' 'The Chinese Revolution and the CCP,' and the 'Important Documents of the CPPCC.'" (JMJP Nov. 2, 1951.)

The fact that the Chinese Communists intend to use the Moslem leaders to extend Chinese Communist propaganda to their co-religionists in the Middle East may be seen in the statement in the Jen-min jih-pao (June 6, 1952) that the religious leaders of the Northwest were aroused "to boundless sympathy and concern for the people of the Arab countries of the Middle East—Egypt and Iran—in their fight for national liberation and struggle against the United States and British imperialism and to adopt concerted action to support their struggle."

The first act of the preparatory committee of the Chinese Islamic Association was to assist the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Communist government in publicity work in the Arab countries. In August 1952, it organized a Chinese Hajji Mission to visit Mecca, which, for reasons unexplained, turned back upon reaching Pakistan without going on to its destination. However, two months later, many Moslem leaders from Asiatic countries were invited to attend the Peace Conference of Asian and Pacific Regions, held in Peking, during which Burkhan, chairman of the Association, at a reception to the Moslem delegates, told them that "our religion as well as our customs and habits are fully respected" by the Communist regime. His speech dwelt, however, more on the material benefits than on religious well-being of the people in the Northwest except to say
N that they were permitted to observe their festivals.
[793] Deprived of their civil and judicial duties, the Moslem clergy

795 668 The demands of the natives of Sinkiang for independence were accentuated in the 1930's by the introduction of pan-Islamic ideals from India. These ideals for a union of Moslem peoples which transcends national boundaries, fired the imagination of the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang and bolstered their nationalistic aspirations. As they served to mobilize Turkestanian nationalists to oppose Nationalist rule in the 1940's, so they have inspired Turkestanian resistance against the Communists since 795 668 1949. In speeches and in publications, the Communist leaders have vehemently denounced pan-Islam as a major obstacle to the 177 policy of bringing the native peoples of Turkestan into the "great family of nationalities" of Communist China.

Perhaps, because pan-Islam is still an incohate movement, having attractive and high-sounding goals but not the organization and strength to achieve these goals, the Chinese Communists, despite their denunciation of it, have not regarded it as a great threat in comparison to that of other religions, like, for example, the Roman Catholic Church, which have external ties. Consequently, in the first years of Communist rule, they proclaimed a policy of benevolence toward the Moslems largely for the propaganda value of such a policy.

A number of Moslem fellow-travelers readily responded, and other Moslem leaders, out of self-interest, also acquiesced to the Communists. Still others hoped to carry on even under the narrow restrictions imposed upon them by the Communist government. The majority of the Moslem peoples of the Northwest, learning from the experience of their co-religionists in Soviet Central Asia, have evolved a way of life which is to live in the Communist world without becoming a part of it. Privately, they still regard themselves as belonging to the Moslem world.

795 798 668 177 A large number of the Moslems in Chinese Turkestan, following the militant tradition of their forefathers, chose to resist the Communists, and the Communists treated them, not as Moslems, but as counter-revolutionaries. Consequently, while proclaiming their policy of benevolence toward the Moslems, a policy reserved for only those who submit, the Communists also carried out a violent program of persecution. As soon as they entered Sinkiang in 1949, the first act of the Chinese Communists was to undermine the influence of the Moslem clergy. A number of religious institutions were closed, and the landed property of the clergy—the waqf—were confiscated. Chinese 692 Communist judges took over the judicial functions of the qadi and the people's courts took over the handling of criminal and civil cases, while the so-claimed cultural cadres assumed the guidance of the daily life of the people. The local branches of the China Islamic Association and other mass organizations supplanted the leadership of the Moslem clergy. With institution of

S
795 civil marriage, marriage and divorce ceased to be an important
798 function administered by the qadi.
668
177 Thousands of religious scholars and intellectuals, denounced as counter-revolutionaries, were arrested. The people's courts tried some thirty thousand Moslems, sentencing some to death and others to life imprisonment. Soviet forces were reported to have joined the Chinese Communist troops in suppressing the anti-Communist uprisings, in which it is estimated that 130,000 Moslems were slaughtered, 260,000 sentenced to forced labor and 150,000 fled from Sinkiang. [Figures based on Hikmah (Indonesian weekly), July 23, 1955, in Missionary Bulletin, January, 1954, and report of Mochtar Gazali, member of the Executive Council of the Federation of Indonesian Moslem Labor, in Missionary Bulletin, July 1953.]

S
[648] [669]

But the persecutions have failed to wipe out opposition from large segments of the Moslem population. As late as the spring of 1956, it was still charged that "counter-revolutionaries" were hiding in religious circles and "under the cloak of religion they carried out various kinds of destructive activities." (Report of Su Chen-yung, vice director of the Bureau of Public Security, Kansu People's Government, in Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956.)

N
795 B. Lamaism
792
*668 As was the case with Islam, the present regime has also
177 tried to placate Lamaism as a device to attract the loyalties of the Lamaistic peoples, the Mongols and the Tibetans. Famous Lama temples were kept in a good state of repair, Lamaist priests and dignitaries received subvention and a certain restraint was shown toward interfering with strictly religious practices (for details see IMAR Handbook, Religion). More particularly, the two highest priests of Tibetan Lamaism, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, both 'teen-agers, by the way, were kept at Peking for long periods of time and shown around at international gatherings.

N
795 Attitudes toward Lamaism as a religion and an institution
792 differ somewhat in the Mongolian and the Tibetan contexts. Gen-
*563 erally speaking, it can be said that among the Mongols the in-
*668 fluence of Lamaism was on the wane. Even among those Mon-
177 gols who stuck to their traditions and maintained loyalty to their princes, there was a tendency to break loose gradually from the leading-strings of the Lamaseries. Already in pre-Communist times, progressive Mongols supported this movement. The Regent of the Alashan Mongols, for instance, had made it a rule to submit Lama novices to compulsory secular education and military training in order to educate them out of Lamaism. No reports are available on how Mongolian Lamas have reacted to

000 communities.

795 668 199 The Russian Orthodox Church in Sinkiang had quite a different fate.[1] By 1938 the Vicariate of Urumchi comprised eight parishes and counted fifteen thousand faithful. It was headed by Mgr. Juvenal Kilm, who in the meantime has been promoted to the Archbishopric of Omsk. Archpriest Dimitry Mlodzyanovky is now active in Urumchi, and it is reported that the number of believers is increasing.

1, [In contrast to the Roman Catholic church in Northwest China, see pp. 359-361--Analyst]

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI1

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

1. The Turks of Sinkiang

186 795 A. The Concept of the Unity of the Moslem World

The Moslems of Sinkiang (Turkic: Türk-e-stan 'Land of the Turks') identify themselves strongly with the rest of the Moslem World. In spite of the many divergencies in national cultures of the various elements which constitute the Moslem world, there is a supernational religious civilization which unifies them all. The feeling and firm conviction of unity of all believers finds expression in the Koran as well as in the traditions and the extensive Islamic literature, and in propaganda slogans which became current since the turning of the century, such as: ittihad ve terakki 'u 'unity and progress', or Muslimlerin hakki birles "Moslim people unite'. The rest of the world is looked at as being apart from the Moslem World - being the domain of war, whereas the area under Moslem jurisdiction is considered the domain of peace. [208]

186 208 795 This feeling may have its roots in the history of the propagation of Islam where political institutions and allegiance went hand in hand with religious institutions and allegiance. The acceptance of the religion of Islam, Din-al-Islam, meant also the acceptance of the Moslem political state. The allegiance with a definite political tinge of many Moslems who do not live today under Moslem control remains with the leaders of the Moslem World. They may feel an even stronger attachment to the Moslem leaders than they do to their own non-Moslem political rulers, as has been the case in Sinkiang under Chinese domination. The allegiance and recognition of the Turks of Sinkiang went to the Ottoman Turkish Empire and later to the leaders of Western Turkestan rather than to their Chinese rulers. It is reasonable to assume that the Moslems of Sinkiang today identify themselves much more strongly with the world of Islam than they do with the Communist block. They think of themselves in terms of being Moslems and not in terms of being Communists. No matter how much indoctrination has gone into uprooting this allegiance to the Islamic world, it will take a whole new thoroughly indoctrinated generation to forget the strong sentiments and attachments to the rest of the Moslem world.

668 B. Turkic Nationalism

Besides having supernational allegiance and sentiments of attachment to the Moslem world, there is also a strong nationalistic movement among the Turks of Sinkiang (called milli tahrik). They consider themselves as being a part of Turkestan as a whole and not as belonging to China. They view themselves as Turks, and not as Chinese nationals. They do not regard their position as a national minority in China as the answer to their national

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

because there is nothing for which to exchange it. Once a week a caravan carrying Government supplies deposits a bag of flour at the door. This is the subsidy granted to them, in exchange of which her husband is bound to be at his post all through the year, and keep the well from being choked by sand. She has never thought in terms which refer to anything except meals, births and occasionally deaths. Her boys may go farther afield, and if they do, she knows that they will never return, but after a time she will become accustomed to their absence and it will not trouble her again."

With spiritual senses dormant, mental powers arrested and physical demands reduced to the minimum, wherein shall a human being show that he differs from the beasts whose conditions he shares? There is hardly anything which can be called attitudes or reactions.

About the Chinese-speaking Moslems Miss Cable reports that Chinese travelers avoid any inn operated by Moslems because of the rudeness to which they may be subjected when using it. This is a very particular observation, as in other places in the Northwest, non-Moslem Chinese prefer to go to Mohammedan restaurants, which are famed for their cleanliness and tasty food. In many places Moslems have monopolized the innkeeper business, so that they cannot possibly be avoided. Even the Chinese guests abstain from eating pork during their stay, every pot and pan which they possess is considered unclean and will not be allowed inside the kitchen. This is not conducive to good feeling between host and guest, and may at any time lead to high words and even to blows. Toward known westerners the Moslems' attitude is somewhat different, and more tolerant. Cable records the experience of her party in staying in an inn with the sign of "Pure and True Religion" by saying, "The attitude toward our party was different because, though we were styled kaper (infidel) we were known to keep a 'clean' kitchen, which is to say that pork, lard, and every produce of the pig was rigidly excluded from our menu. We were 'infidels of the book' for the Bible and not the Koran was our guide, but we were not 'infidels of the pig' which was an insult reserved for eaters of unclean food. The closest watch was kept upon us as we journeyed, and any lapse or laxity would have been reported to every mosque on our route, so that 'pure religion' inns would have been closed to us. Moslems acknowledged that we were as free from idolatry as themselves, but openly stigmatized us as blasphemers, for we called the prophet Jesus 'Son of God', and the innkeeper turned aside to spit whenever he heard the word." (pp. 72-73). The Moslems who are of means like to make others understand that they are wealthy people. "Like other Tungan landlords to whose houses we had the entree, he left us with a sense that he was very wealthy and that his

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

apparent trade of innkeeping was simply a cover for another and more lucrative business." (p. 73).

Like the Chinese, the sinicized Moslems are very much concerned with the problem of offspring. To them continuity of life is bound up with that prolongation of existence which a son secures, one who carries on the life which he owes to his parents. This is a completely Chinese concept. The Chinese-speaking Moslems cannot understand and would certainly not accept the Christian faith that life after death is God's gift, that one does not depend upon a son and his worship, and that immortality means the soul or spirit living eternally in Heaven. Miss Cable records in her book: "We talked often of these things, but it was hard for them to understand what I told them, and they would turn it off with one excuse or another. 'She is different from us', they said, 'her life is given up to God's work and her merit will secure her an entrance to Paradise'. Some envied, some pitied, some just stared and made no effort to understand, others summed it up in these words: 'Eastern ways are for the East, Western ways are for the West.'" (p. 75).

The Chinese-speaking Moslems in the Northwest, in spite of their having taken up a considerable amount of the Chinese way of life, are deeply conscious of racial and religious inadaptability to Chinese rules. Most of them are always rebellious. They always think that they are oppressed or unfairly treated by the Chinese authorities. For this reason, Moslem revolts occur in the Northwest frequently. For example, the immediate cause of the the 1930 revolt was, according to Miss Cable's account, the suspicion of the Moslems that the Chinese Government was to change their age-old social and political system and that the Chinese population in the area goat many advantages at the expense of the Moslems. Up to 1930 the Moslems in the Hami district of Sinkiang were always governed by a ruler of their own race, religion and speech. The last one of their rulers was Khan Maksud Shah. This ruler died during the year 1930. The Chinese Sinkiang Government took this opportunity to end the Moslem system and the succession of the Khan was not allowed to continue. Maksud's son, Nazir, heir to the throne was summoned to report at Urumchi, then capital of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, and Yolbars, the Tiger Prince, was ordered to appear with him. This was bad news for the Moslem inhabitants. Later, a word came from the capital that the young prince had been made a prisoner in his own lodging, and that there were to be many changes in the standing of the Turki people. When Yolbars returned to Hami he left Nazir in Urumchi, and arrived in company with a band of Chinese officials who at once sat down to business and drew up a list of changes which were to be introduced in the administration of the Moslem community. The old administration

175 668 [793] [346] [795] mass meeting of 3,500 mullahs in 46 mosques in Urumchi was held on May 20, 1951, and again on May 25, 1953, to reaffirm their pledge to support Mao Tse-tung, the CCP, the Central People's Government and the Re sist-America and Aid-Korea campaign. Burkhan, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Government, was concurrently head of the China Islamic Association, which had the responsibility of rallying the Moslems of China under the banner of the Chinese Communists.

"Through the above-mentioned activities," declared Yü Chan-lin, vice-chairman of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Conference, "the policies of the (Communist) party and the people's government ...have been conveyed to the masses of various nationalities and various circles (i.e., political groups), so that the misgivings and the hesitant attitude on the part of certain people were corrected and the masses mobilized... thus enlarging the anti-feudal United Front." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). As for the future, Yü urged further propaganda on "patriotism and internationalism" by means of mass movements, intensification of the mobilization of all the nationalities and all the political groups, and further supervision over the masses.

The Sinkiang jih-pao, in an editorial (June 30, 1953), also expressed gratification with the progress of the mobilization of the masses. "During the past four years, the people of all nationalities and all circles have been educated by repeated patriotic campaigns and experiences in various political activities, thereby increasing their organizational ability and their political consciousness. The general election will further consolidate and unite the people of all nationalities and the ties between the People's Government and the masses, thus enabling the state system of our people's democratic dictatorship to become more perfect."

C. Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries

668 669 578 175 The efforts of the Communists to herd and regiment the people were not accomplished without considerable resistance. Large segments of the people refused to enter into the Communist fold and their resistance, strong and stubborn, made it necessary for the Communist authorities to launch campaigns for the suppression of the opposition, whom the Communists designate as "counter-revolutionaries."

The "counter-revolutionaries" or "bandits" were, according to Wang Chen, commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, composed of the following groups: (1) Former Nationalist forces; (2) local forces under Osman Batur, Mehmet Emin Bughra, Jamin Khan and Yolbars Khan; (3) White Russians; (4) members of secret societies; (5) bandits; and, he added, "all sorts of subversive espionage organizations (which)

175 of the Communist hierarchy and externally by popular resistance.
177 The temporary setback in the program of collectivization in
668 Shensi and Kansu in 1954 had been attributed to the hostility of the peasants and the ineptitude of the cadres. As late as March, 1954, it was revealed that "the cultural standard of the cadres was low; only one in every three cadres could read.... The work of political propaganda and education of the peasants in some areas has not been carried out well and penetratingly enough." (Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956). One of the main reasons for the inertia of the cadres and party members, said Chang Chung-liang, secretary of the Kansu Chinese Communist Party committee, was their fear of the new situation created by the transition from New Democracy to socialism, which has been added to their rightist ideology. (NCNA November 2, 1955).

175 Besides the fear of the future, another demoralizing factor
668 was the unwillingness of the cadres and party members to leave
414 their positions in the governments and to work in the cooperatives
578 in the countryside, in defiance of the orders of their superiors. As Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Chinese Communist Party sub-bureau, pointed out: "The largest defect during the past year was the failure on the part of party committees of all levels to resolutely, effectively, and properly transfer the leadership center to rural work in mutual aid and cooperation. Certain defects also exist in our work in the nationalities and religious fields." (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

175 The defects in nationality work were still charged to "the
668 vestiges of great nation chauvinism and local nationalism," caused
563 by "the practice of usurpation by Han Chinese coming from other
578 parts of China," and their disrespect to the minority cadres, and by the minority cadres who were "conceited, unwilling to study, refusing to observe discipline and doing things not according to policy and principle." (NCNA September 17, 1954.)

The incompetence and demoralization of the cadres and party members, who constitute the main working force of the Communists in the domination of the Northwest, and the discord and friction within their ranks went, pari passu, with the opposition of the people, to undermine the rule of the Chinese Communists. As in the past, popular opposition to the government was often carried on under the trappings of religion. In the Chinese inhabited
[794] areas of Shensi and Kansu, the Taoist secret society known as
[575] I-kuan-tao was still alive and active in the summer of 1955, and the farmers were required to sign pacts pledging to support the government in banning this sect.

175 Out in Sinkiang, pan-Islamism still gripped the mind of the
668 people who are predominantly Moslem. "Individual counter-revo-
669 lutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam," said Burkhan last
578 year, "and, putting on the cloak of religion, are carrying out
795

175 counter-revolutionary activities." He said that they were carrying
668 on "rumor spreading, sabotage, and the deception of the masses in
669 an attempt to undermine our revolutionary unity." (Sinkiang jih-
578 pao, February 25, 1955). Consequently, he went on, only "legal"
795 religious activities would be permitted by the people's government.
[798] By spring of 1956, as the heavy hand of Communist rule was
668 intensified, the counter-revolutionary activities of the people also
669 increased. Su Chen-yung, deputy director of the Bureau of Public
578 Security in the Kansu People's government, revealed the extent of
popular unrest in the Northwest when he said: "The counter-revolutionaries have unceasingly waged their destructive activities against the socialist transformation enterprises in both the cities and the countryside. With the purpose of impeding the work of peasants joining the cooperatives and sabotaging the agricultural production, they concentrated on certain reactionary landowners, wealthy peasants and Taoist leaders to cheat backward elements into establishing false cooperatives and even organizing uprisings. Counter-revolutionaries hidden in factories, mines, and basic construction projects resort to such base acts as sabotaging technical reforms, stealing government secrets, and purposely committing errors of work in order to proceed with their destructive activities. Counter-revolutionaries also hid themselves in religious circles. Under the cloak of religion, they proceeded upon various kinds of destructive activities." (Kansu jih-pao, March 18, 1956).

This revelation of popular opposition to Communist rule almost six years after its establishment in the Northwest shows that the age-old conflicts of culture and ideology, which in the past have divided the region, and the stubborn recalcitrance of the people, which makes government difficult, still remain despite the efforts of the Chinese Communists in centralization and domination, in indoctrination and repression, which were unprecedented in their severity and ruthlessness. The divisive nature of the region and the discontent of the people are intrinsic conditions and cardinal factors in the political life of China's Northwest. Even the Communists themselves, in their public statements, have candidly acknowledged the difficulties and foresee greater resistance from the people as the program for socialism gets under way.